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H. ALAN PELL*

Phosphate in the Forest:
Mandated or Precluded by
the Mineral Leasing Actt
INTRODUCTION

Phosphorous was discovered in 1669 by Hennig Brandt,I an obscure
alchemist in Hamburg. Herr Brandt "distilled a strange wax-like substance [which] glowed and sputtered, and gave off an eerie, yellowish
light." 2 While the mystery surrounding phosphorous has abated, its importance to the world's population has not. A wide variety of manufactured
goods require the use of phosphorous, 3 but it is utilized primarily as an
essential component of fertilizer.4
Unfortunately, the most common method of procuring phosphorous
requires strip-mining for phosphate rock. Although strip-mining for phosphate rock has been carried on in central Florida for many years, 5 the
phosphate industry only recently focused its attention on the forested
lands of northern Florida. 6 While reclamation efforts on strip-mined lands
have met with varying degrees of success, where the land to be stripmined bears other valuable resources, restoration may not be possible. 7
*Attorney at Law, Gainesville, Florida.
'This paper won the 1983 Dean Maloney Memorial Writing Contest award of the Environmental
Land Use Section, Florida Bar Association.
1. Florida Phosphate Council, Phosphate, Florida's Hidden Blessing (undated pamphlet). 2. Id.
3. Phosphorous, or a compound-by-product, is used in the manufacturing process of the following
products: matches, toothbrush and toothpaste, shaving cream, detergents, soft drinks, cast iron,
steel, gasoline, oil, baking powder, water softeners, textile dyes, and photographic film. [Nonexclusive list] Id. at 16, 17.
4. The total marketable phosphate rock production in 1977 was 47,256,094 metric tons. Of this
amount, 40,575,041 metric tons were produced in Florida and North Carolina and were used in
fertilizer and animal feed supplements. Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior, Draft
Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement (hereinafter "S-FES"), Proposed Phosphate Leasing On The Osceola National Forest, Florida 1-2 (April 5, 1979).
5. Phosphate mining, using draglines, has been done in Central Florida since the 1920s, principally
in Polk, Manatee, and Hillsborough Counties. Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior,
Final Environmental Statement (hereinafter "FES"), Phosphate Leasing On The Osceola National
Forest 1-27 (June 27, 1974).
6. The Occidental Petroleum Corporation is currently operating a phosphate mining operation
approximately eight miles west of the Osceola National Forest boundary. Id. at I-1.
7. A necessary distinction must be made at this point. Reclamation is geared towards improving
the quality of land which has been mined, i.e., making the land usable for any purpose, or more
aesthetically appealing. Restoration insures that the land is, or will be, placed in its original state.
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With the day approaching when phosphate supplies will be exhausted, 8
the federal government faces increasingly difficult resource management
decisions. The Mineral Leasing Act9 (hereinafter "MLA"), designed to
promote and to control the exploitation of mineral resources, has fomented
considerable litigation.'" The MLA may well be inherently inconsistent
with other federal statutes enacted to protect other valuable resources."
This paper examines the MLA-specifically, its provisions which authorize and control the mining of phosphate on national forest land. The
examination focuses on the Act in the context of a recently litigated case.
In Florida ex rel. Smith v. Watt 2 (hereinafter Florida v. Watt), the state
of Florida sought to enjoin the federal government from issuing phosphate
mining leases to four corporations, 13 on 52,000 acres of forest, streams,
and wetlands in the Osceola National Forest.' 4 The federal district court
ruled that the lawsuit was not ripe for judicial review because the Secretary
of the Interior, James Watt, had not yet determined whether the phosphate
deposits were valuable enough to allow surface minings.S
The current controversy aids in the framework for the discussion for
several reasons. First, a clearer understanding of the mechanics of the
MLA is facilitated by description of its actual application. Second, by a
portrayal of actual resources involved in a decision to issue mining leases
pursuant to the MLA, the immediate, and perhaps irreversible, conse8. "Florida's phosphate rock mines will not be a significant factor in the supply structure after
2005. By 1995, the mine capacity will not be able to supply the projected domestic demand." FES,
at 1-12. Interestingly, the Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement, in addition to having
a somewhat contradictory title, replaces the above-quoted section in the FES with a more generalized
statement concerning production levels, and makes no mention of definitive supply exhaustion dates.
For a comprehensive, scientific analysis of phosphorous availability, see RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE, INC., THE LONG-RUN AVAILABILITY OF PHOSPHOROUS, A CASE STUDY IN
MINERAL RESOURCE ANALYSIS (1975).
9. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976, Supp. 1 1977, Supp. 11 1978, Supp. III 1979, Supp. IV 1980,
& Supp. V 1981).
10. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Utah International, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 976 (D. Colo. 1980).
11. See Martin, The Interrelationshipsof the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the Wilderness Act,
and the EndangeredSpecies Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVTL. L. 363 (1982).
12. No. 82-421-Civ-J-B (M.D. Fla., May 3, 1982). Gov. Bob Graham and Senators Lawton
Chiles and Paula Hawkins joined as plaintiffs in the suit.
13. The corporations which have applied for mining leases are: Monsanto Corporation, KerrMcGee Corporation, Pittsburg & Midway Co. (Gulf Mineral Resource), and Global Exploration and
Development.
14. This figure represents 34 percent of the forest. Workable deposits have been identified on
28,000 of these acres, which is but one-third of a larger deposit located on adjacent private lands.
FES, supra note 5, at I-1. See supra note 6. The Osceola National Forest is situated northeast of
Lake City, Florida, in eastern Columbia and western Baker Counties.
15. On January 3, 1983, to the surprise and disbelief of all parties concerned, Secretary Watt
denied the issuance of the phosphate mining leases. On the very next day, throwing the controversy
into further turmoil, President Reagan vetoed a bill which would have paid the preference right
leaseholders for their mining rights. See DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BILLS, H.R. 9, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess.

July 19841

PHOSPHATE IN THE FOREST

quences of such a decision become apparent. Third, an actual application
of the Act best brings its vagaries into view, i.e., language which tends
to be the focal point of litigation is highlighted. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, the case underscores the role of the courts in addressing an
alleged failure by federal agencies to comply with MLA provisions.16
THE OSCEOLA NATIONAL FOREST
A knowledge of the origins of the Osceola National Forest helps in
understanding the basis of the state of Florida's objection to the issuance
of phosphate mining leases. The National Forest Reclamation Commission, proceeding under the authority of the Weeks Law,' 7 approved the
Osceola lands purchase in 1929. The law authorized and directed the
Secretary of Agriculture to "examine, locate, and purchase such forested,
cut-over, or denuded lands within the watersheds of navigable streams
as in his judgment may be necessary to the regulation of the flow of
navigable streams or for the production of timber ....","
On July 10, 1931, President Hoover designated the acquired lands 9
as the Osceola National Forest. 2' The President's action was subject to
the Organic Administration Act of 189721 which provides, inter alia, that
No national forest shall be established except to improve and protect
the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States; but it is not the purpose or intent of these provisions, or of

said section, to authorize the inclusion therein of lands more valuable
for the mineral therein, or for agricultural purposes, than for forest
purposes.22
16. At the time this paper was written, it was not apparent that Secretary Watt would find that
mining in the Osceola was "precluded," as the title of this work suggests. The sentence in the text
which is the subject of this note, however, has proved portentous. Ironically, a preference right
leaseholder, Kerr-McGee Corporation, filed suit against Secretary Watt, alleging that he failed to
comply with MLA provisions in his decision to deny the leases.
17. The "Weeks Law" is the popular name for 16 U.S.C. §§480, 500, 513-519, 521, 552, 563
(1982). 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1982), which had provided for the approval of the National Forest Reclamation Commission, was amended by Act of October 22, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 17(a)(3),
90 Stat. 2961. With the abolishment of the Commission, the Secretary ofAgriculture now has plenary
authority to recommend and approve lands for purchase. 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1982).
18. 16 U.S.C. §515 (1982).
19. The fact that the land was acquired, and not reserved from the public domain, is significant.
Decisions to lease acquired lands are subject to the provisions of Chapter 7 of the MLA, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 351-59 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. V 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
20. The authority to designate lands as national forests was granted by The Creative Act of 1891,
ch. 561, §24, 26 Stat. 1103 repealed, Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, Title VII,
§704(a), 90 Stat. 2792.
21. 16 U.S.C. §475 (1982).
22. Id (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes 23-25 for basis of congressional
concern about over-inclusion of land within national forest boundaries.
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The above statute was congressional reaction to the broad authority
granted to the President by the Creative Act of 1891,23 and was passed
to prevent, as viewed by some western Congressmen, the frequent indiscriminate creation of federal reserves to the detriment and "anguish"
of western settlers.2 4 It was President Cleveland's response to conservationists, in reserving 21 million acres of forest land in February, 1897,
which ultimately led to congressional passage of the Act.'
Although some national forest lands became the focal point of litigation
concerning the reservation of forest resources,26 the Osceola has been
utilized primarily for timbering, recreation, wildlife, and water quality. 27
The forest consists of cypress swamps, hardwood wetlands, and pineland
systems, 28 with surface waters and streams of the highest quality. 29 The
23. See supra note 20.
24. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706, n. 13 (1978).
25. Id. at 706. Congress also suspended President Cleveland's Executive Order, which had more
than doubled the acreage of then-existing United States forest reserves. Id. at 706, n. 12.
26. There has been a paucity of cases construing the Organic Administration Act of 1897. In a
landmark decision, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether the United States had reserved water rights in the Gila National Forest for
aesthetic, recreational, wildlife preservation, or stockwatering purposes. The Court construed the
Organic Administration Act as showing congressional intent that water is reserved "only where
necessary to preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows for private and public uses under
state law." Id. at 718. Further, the Court noted that "[e]ach time this Court has applied the "impliedreservation-of-water doctrine," it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific
purposesfor which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposesof the
reservation would be entirely defeated." Id. at 700 (cits. omitted) (emphasis added). Although the
case at hand involves acquired land, the Court's concern for the protection of the purposes for which
the land was reserved (acquired), is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1976, Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. V 1981) (see discussion
of Section 352, infra text accompanying notes 73-76). Subject to verification that land stripmined
for phosphate will support timber production, altering the capacity of national forest land to support
its primary purpose is apparently in derogation of the rationale inherent in United States v. New
Mexico.
In Florida v. Watt, the complaint states that "the final lease stipulations are wholly inadequate to
protect and preserve the Osceola National Forest for those purposes for which the said national
forest was acquired, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §§ 475, 520, 528, nor are the said stipulations adequate
ever to restore the saidforest to its present use and purpose." Florida v. Watt, No. 82-421-Civ-JB, slip op. at 30 (emphasis added). Further, the S-FES, supra note 4, states that "Nothing to date
has proved or demonstrated that commercial sawtimber production will be reestablished on mined
lands within the Osceola." Id. at 1-6.
27. Florida v. Watt, No. 82-421-Civ-J-B at 9.
28. Of the 52,000 acres proposed for phosphate leasing, approximately 46,700 acres are being
managed for sustained yield timber production. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 7. Three streams within the Osceola, as well as the Suwannee River, are designated
as Outstanding Florida Waters, pursuant to § 17-3.041 of the FLA. ADMIN. CODE. In addition to
the enabling rule's subjection to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 120.050-120.73 (West 1978, Cum. Supp. 1982), designation as an Outstanding Florida
Water requires adherence to rigid procedural guidelines, including: at least one fact-finding workshop;
notice to all county or municipal governments and state legislators whose districts include all or part
of a Special Water; prominent public notice; and an economic impact analysis. FLA. ADMIN. CODE
Rule 17-3.041(2)(a)-(e). The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation may designate a
water as a Special Water upon a finding that the environmental, social, and economic benefits of
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Osceola contains 68 percent pineland systems, and 19 percent bay systems
(cypress and bay swamps). Water systems account for the remaining
acreage, approximately, 1,340 acres.3"
The population of deer, grey squirrel, turkey, fox squirrel, quail, and
wood ducks, among other species, provide a diverse wildlife within the
forest. 3 Additionally, there are 21 wildlife species, listed by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service or State of Florida as either threatened or
endangered, which have been suspected or confirmed to be present in the
Osceola, or the nearby Suwannee River.32
Three large groundwater reservoirs underlay the Osceola, two of which
are the source of a larger groundwater system used by the populace of
northeastern Florida.33 The third, the Floridan Aquifer, is the primary
artesian aquifer in Florida.34 In some areas in Baker and Columbia Counties, the Floridan aquifer is at or near the surface, which is significant in
that some phosphate processing water must be discharged into the ground-

water during mining operations.35

the action outweigh the environmental, social, and economic costs. Id. at (2)(f) (emphasis added).
Kerr-McGee Corporation, applicants for a mining lease in the Osceola, recently challenged Rule
17-3.041(1) and (4)(k), which designated the waters within the Osceola's boundaries as Outstanding
Florida Waters-as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, Kerr-McGee Corporation
v. Florida, 4 F.A.L.R. 1994-A (September 20, 1982). The Administrative Hearing Officer held that
since Kerr-McGee had not shown that it was entitled to a mining lease in the Osceola, it had no
immediate or present interest in the contents of any rules setting standards for the waters within the
Osceola. Thus, Kerr-McGee's petition was dismissed for a lack of standing to challenge the validity
of the Rule. Id. at 1995-A.
30. S-FES, supra note 4, at 11-23.
31. FES, supra note 5, at 11-41.
32. In reply to a request from the Director of the Eastern States Office of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) for a consultation pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) appointed a consultation team
to determine whether the proposed phosphate mining would likely jeopardize the continued existence
of listed threatened or endangered species. The Director of the USFWS, in his report to the BLM,
concluded that on information and data available, "it is my biological opinion that ... the issuance
of leases for surface extraction of phosphate on 52,000 acres in the Osceola National Forest is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the ... species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of their identified Critical Habitats." Letter from Lynn A. Greenwalt, Director, USFWS,
to Lowell J. Udy, Director, Eastern States Office, BLM, dated June 28, 1978, reprintedin, S-FES,
supra note 4, at XII-11.
For a discussion of the absolute prohibition of agency action which is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species, see Martin, supra note 11, at 390.
33. Florida v. Watt, No. 82-421-Civ-J-B at 7.
34. FES, supra note 5, at 11-35.
35. The Director of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation has signed an order
requiring a phosphate mining company to apply for groundwater permits for a proposed phosphate
mining operation in Manatee County, in order to protect county residents' drinking water supplies.
Office of Public Information, State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, News Release
(May 28, 1982). The additional requirement for a groundwater discharge permit is based on a finding
that "[t]here will, be seepage of mine processing water into the groundwater from the mining
activities ...
" Id. The Director noted that the DER would consider groundwater impacts in all
future permitting reviews for phosphate mining in the state.
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The discovery of phosphate deposits in the Osceola, which ultimately
led to the applications for preference right leases, resulted from a search
for phosphate deposits in Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia.36 With a growing world demand for fertilizer in the early 1960s,
a number of companies engaged in intensive exploratory drilling on both
private and federally owned land. One area which was heavily tested for
its phosphate rock content was the North Florida-South Georgia region.
In an area over 150 miles long, ranging from south of Ocala, Florida to
north of Valdosta, Georgia,37 the following federal lands were explored:
The Apalachicola National Forest (556,972 acres) in Franklin, Leon,
Liberty, and Wakulla Counties; The Ocala National Forest (366,037 acres)
National Forest
in Lake, Marion, and Putman Counties; and The Osceola
3
(157,231 acres) in Baker and Columbia Counties. 1
Exploratory drilling 39 revealed that neither the Apalachicola nor Ocala
National Forests contained valuable deposits. Drilling, however, did indicate that the western half of the Osceola was promising enough for
further exploration. Additional prospecting would necessitate the issuance
of Bureau of Land Management prospecting permits, which grant a preference right to mining leases in the event valuable deposits are discovered.'
Kerr-McGee Oil Industry, Inc., filed the first application for a prospecting permit on September 11, 1964. 4" From 1965 to 1968, a total of
92 prospecting permits were issued, of which 41 were used as the basis
for applications for preference right leases.42 The determination that valuable deposits had been discovered, the prerequisite to lease entitlement,
was made by the United States Geological Survey, as a designee of the
Department of Interior, on March 28, 1969 and December 11, 1970. 43
In 1971, the State of Florida filed a complaint against the Secretary of
the Interior" (Morton) seeking to enjoin the issuance of the mining leases.
36. FES, supra note 5, at 1-6.
37. Id. at 1-7, 8.
38. Id.
39. The drilling program was accomplished in 1964 and 1965 under Forest Service prospecting
permits, to be distinguished from Bureau of Land Management prospecting permits issued pursuant
to the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 211 (b) (1976).
40. The issues arising out of the issuance of such permits, and the alleged entitlement to phosphate
mining leasese, are the focal points of the controversy at hand. See discussion of the Mineral Leasing
Act, infra text accompanying notes 54-70.
41. FES, supra note 5, at 1-9.
42. Id.
43. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Florida, 4 F.A.L.R. at 1994-A.
44. No. 1496-71 (D.D.C. 1971).
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The court denied the injunction on October 17, 1972, pending compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act. 45
The Eastern States Office of the Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior, prepared a draft Environmental Impact Statement in
1973, and a final statement (FES) in 1974. The Secretary of the Interior,
concerned that further studies were needed to evaluate the impact of the
proposed mining on hydrological resources and on endangered and threatened wildlife species, directed that additional studies be carried out. 46 A
draft Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement (S-FES) therefore
was prepared both to correct the shortcomings of the FES and, in many
areas, up-date information contained in the FES. 47
In 1976, Kerr-McGee sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior
(Kleppe) to issue a lease for phosphate mining in the Osceola, pursuant
to 30 U.S.C. § 211(b). 48 The Chief of the Conservation Division of the
U.S. Geological Survey presented an affidavit to the court, noting that
although "valuable deposit" determinations had been made in 1969 and
1970, "it had been determined that the criteria upon which such determinations were based [were] insufficient to meet the requirements of 30
U.S.C. §211 (1970), and the new regulations which had been promulgated in May of 1976. " " The court ruled, however, that Kerr-McGee
had a vested interest and a statutory entitlement to the mining leases, and
the recent regulations would not void that interest.5 0
The Secretary appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the federal district court. The court
found that the appellee should have exhausted its administrative remedies
before seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus, which had cut short
ongoing administrative proceedings before the Secretary of Interior.5
The case under discussion, Floridaex. rel. Smith v. Watt, was initiated
with the filing of the Amended Complaint on May 3, 1982. The plaintiffs
brought the action, as noted in the Introduction to the complaint, "on
behalf of the State of Florida to protect their interests from Defendant's
actions designed to facilitate and permit stripmining of the Osceola National Forest located in northern Florida, in52 violation of federal and state
laws and local forest management plans."
45. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1976, Supp. 1 1977, Supp. 11 1978, Supp. III 1979, Supp. IV
1980 & Supp. V 1981).
46. S-FES, supra note 4, at I-1.
47. The Supplement was filed on April 5, 1979.
48. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Andrus, No. 76-0608 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd. per curiam,
574 F.2d 637 (D.C. cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
49. Id. Affidavit, Kerr-McGee Corp., 4 F.A.L.R. at 1994-A.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Florida v. Watt, No. 82-421-Civ-J-B at 2. Whether the Mineral Leasing Act preempts state

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

THE MINERAL LEASING ACT

The authority of the Secretary of the Interior to grant mineral rights
on public domain land was recognized, and enacted into law, by Congress
in the mid-nineteenth century. 3 The codification of the present system of
leasing public domain land for mineral exploitation occurred early this
century, by Congressional passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 54
Section 211(a) of the MLA, the specific provision which authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior to lease lands containing phosphate deposits,
provides, inter alia: "The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to lease
*

.

. any phosphate deposits of the United States, and lands containing

such deposits, . 55. when in his judgment the public interest will be best
served thereby."
The discretionary authority granted to the Secretary-to issue leases
only when "in his judgment the public interest will be served"-appears
to vanish when read in pari materia wth paragraph (b) of Section 211.
Section 211 (b) provides, in pertinent part, "[I]f ... the permittee shows
to the Secretary that valuable deposits of phosphate have been discovered
*

.

. the permittee shall be entitled to a lease for any or all of the land

embraced in the prospecting permit." 6
This apparent contradiction-granting discretion to protect the public
interest, yet dictating a ministerial act upon a valuable deposit showingis the conspicuous trademark of the preference right leasing process. The
preference right system has created problems and concomitant litigation
of gigantic proportions.5 ' The Federal coal leasing situation throughout
regulation of mining activities conducted on national forest land is beyond the scope of this paper.
In an important decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, and the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed, that the Mineral Leasing Act prohibited a county from requiring a private corporation to
obtain a use permit before engaging in energy development on national forest land. Ventura County
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980). The Court of
Appeals held that a state cannot exercise its police power to regulate mineral development on the
public domain when regulations "impermissibly conflict" with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920. Id. at 1082, as noted in, Preble, PublicLand Law: Pre-emptionof StateRegulation of Mineral
Development on the Public Domain, Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 16 TULSA L. J. 317 (1980).
See the above-cited article and Percival, State and Local Controlof Energy Development on Federal
Lands, 32 STAN. L. R. 373, 376 (1980), for discussion of preemption and critical commentary of
the Ventura decision.
53. See Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in sections of 30, 43
U.S.C.), as noted in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 976 (D.C. Colo. 1980).
54. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976, Supp. 11977, Supp. 111978, Supp. III 1979, Supp. IV 1980,
& Supp. V 1981).
55. 30 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
56. 30 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976).
57. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 10. See also, Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom, Burglin v. Kleppe, 425 U.S. 973 (1976); boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472
(1963).
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the 1970s provides an example of the preference right leasing system
gone awry.5
In 1971, during a period in which coal mining leases were issued on
a preference right system, the Secretary of the Interior instituted a moratorium on federal coal leasing. The moratorium resulted from an excess
of coal lands being held speculatively, and "the federal government was
not best serving the public interest by continued leasing under the standards then extant."' 59 Although the Secretary lifted the moratorium in
1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), attacked the validity of the preference right leasing system in a suit against the Department of the Interior (Berklund).' The court in Berklund concluded that
a permittee, having established "commercial quantities"' 61 of coal within
his permit area, was entitled to a lease.
Significantly, the preference right issue in the coal leasing area has
been removed by congressional action. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 197562 did away with the preference right system for the
leasing of federal land for coal mining.' The preference right system
remains for phosphate, however, as well as for other minerals, 64 and with
it remains the discretionary ministerial perplexity of Section 211, paragraphs (a) and (b). The dichotomy did not go unnoticed by the state of
Florida, in the amended complaint filed in Florida v. Watt. In its request
for relief, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that
Defendant's authority to reject the lease applications is neither
limited nor proscribed by the provisions of 30 U.S.C. § 211(b), which
requires issuance of a lease . . . 30 U.S.C. §211(b) requires that
Defendant grant a lease to the prospecting permittee/lease applicant
only when it is in the public interest pursuant to 30 U.S.C.
§211(a) ..... 6
Argument directed towards the issuance of entitlement, however, faces
severe obstacles. Section 211(b), only a portion of which has been previously cited, reads in entirety:
(b) Where prospecting or exploratory work is necessary to determine the existence of workability of phosphate deposits in any un58. For a history and discussion, see Johns, FederalPreference Right Coal Leases: How Much
"Right" Really exists?, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 389 (1979).
59. Id.
60. National Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), af'd,
609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
61. Section 211 uses the terminology "valuable deposit" as the standard for entitlement.
62. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 308 (1976).
63. See generally, Johns, supra note 58.
64. See infra text accompanying note 68.
65. Amended Complaint at 34, Florida v. Watt.
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claimed, undeveloped area, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized
to issue, to any applicant qualified under this chapter, a prospecting
permit which shall give the exclusive right to prospect for phosphate
deposits, including associated minerals, for a period of two years,
for not more than two thousand five hundred and sixty acres; and if
prior to the expiration of the permit the permittee shows to the
Secretary that valuabledeposits have been discovered within the area
covered by his permit, the permittee shall be entitled to a lease for

any or all of the land embraced in the prospecting permit."
As previously mentioned, NRDC v. Berklund addressed lease entitlement due to the issuance of a permit. 67 Although Section 201(b) of the
Mineral Leasing Act was at issue, the court examined the legislative
history of the MLA and concluded that Congress intended 201(b) to be
mandatory, just as sections 211(b), 262, 272, and 282, pertaining to
68
phosphate, sodium, sulphur, and potash leasing appear to be mandatory.
The court stated that "under 30 U.S.C. §201(b) the Secretary of the
Interior does not have discretion to reject preference right coal leases
where coal has been found in commercial quantities." 69 Additionally, at
least one federal district court has held that §211(b) is clear on its face,
i.e., a permittee who makes the requisite showing has a vested interest
in a phosphate mining lease.7 °
Thus, the claim that the Secretary has discretion to issue the lease
confronts judicial precedent, 7' as well as long-standing Departmental
interpretation requiring issuance upon the requisite showing. 72 A determination by the Secretary, however, that the issuance of mining leases
is not in the public interest, pursuant to section 211(a), may still have
an impact on the issuance of a lease. In fact, it may preclude the issuance
of the lease altogether, if the lease issuance process is enforced rigidly.
Lease Issuance Process

As previously noted,73 the federal government acquired the Osceola
66. 30 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
67. 458 F. Supp. 925.
68. Id. at 934.
69. Id. at 928.
70. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Andrus, No. 76-0608 (D.D.C. 1976) rev'd per curiam, 574
F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
71. See, MineralLeasingAct of 1920: EnvironmentalStandardsSet By DepartmentalRegulations.
20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 367 (1980).
72. The federal district court in Berklund cites the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.9. 1 (1965) as requiring the court to respect an agency's interpretation of its statutory
discretion, and notes that "Since the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act in 1920, the Department
has never wavered in its interpretation of the mandatory langauge of Section 201(b)." 458 F. Supp.
at 935.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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National Forest and did not reserve it from the public domain. In recognition that land acquired by the federal government is so obtained for
specific purpose or usage, the Mineral Leasing Act specifically addresses
the leasing of mineral deposits within acquired lands. 74
Section 352 of the Act provides, inter alia, that
No mineral deposit covered by this section shall be leased except
with the consent of the head of the executive department, independent
establishment, or instrumentality having jurisdiction over the lands
containing such deposit.., and subject to such conditions as that
official may prescribe to insure the adequate utilization of the lands
for the primary purpose for which they have been acquired or are
being administered. . .. "
Previous discussion of the Osceola delineated the primary purpose of
the Osceola's establishment, and its administrative history, i.e., timbering, recreation, wildlife, and water quality.76 Since 1960, the forest has
also been administered pursuant to the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield
Act. 77 16 U.S.C. §528 provides that national forests are established, and
are to be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes.
Thus, the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, Section 352, requires the agency head, in this case, the Chief of the Forest Services,
both to consent to the leasing and provide conditions which insure that
the Osceola will be preserved for timbering, watershed, wildlife, and
recreational purposes. 7 ' The formulation of these conditions, however, is
but one part of the lease issuance process.
A permittee must show, within the term of the permit, that he has
discovered a "valuable" deposit of phosphate. 79 A valuable deposit is
defined by federal regulation:
A permittee has discovered ... a valuable deposit of one of the...
permit minerals if the mineral deposit discovered under the permit
is of such a character and quantity that a prudent person would be
justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means with a
74. 31 U.S.C. §351-59 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. V 1981).
75. Id. §352 (Supp. V 1981).
76. The National Forest Reservation Commission Report. S. DOC. NO. 44, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1929), as cited in, Florida v. Watt, No. 82-421-Civ-J-B, slip op. at 6, states three overall objectives
for the acquisition: (1) provide adequate protection of important watersheds affecting navigability
of streams, (2) provide for future timber supplies directly under national control to safeguard essential
public interests, and (3) promote reforestation and timber production on private lands through
research, demonstration and constructive participation.
77. 16 U.S.C. §§528-31 (1982).
78. But compare discussion of "consent" in the context of Section 211, supra text accompanying
notes 55-57. See also infra text accompanying note 108.
79. 43 C.F.R. 3520.1-1(a) (1982).
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reasonable prospect of success in developing a valuable mine. The
permittee must present sufficient evidence to show that there is a
reasonableexpectation that his revenuesfrom the sale of the mineral
will exceed his costs of developing the mine, and extracting, remov-

ing, and marketing the mineral.80

Thus, if a permittee should be unable to show that the "potential
revenues" of the mine exceed development costs, then he has failed the
valuable deposit test and is not entitled to a mining lease. Therefore, the
determination of what are valid costs of the mining ultimately decides
the entitlement issue.
The findings of a technical examination and environmental analysis,
prepared by the Bureau of Land Management, guide this determination. 8'
The technical examination explores the technical aspects of the proposed
mining operation, and evaluates the impact of such operations on other
land uses, resources, or land management programs.8" The environmental
83
analysis must address the impact of the proposed operation.
A copy of the technical examination-environmental analysis report,
which includes the proposed lease terms and stipulations, is sent to the
lease applicant.' The lease applicant makes a final showing that a valuable
deposit exists and submits it to the Bureau of Land Management.8" If the
final showing is satisfactory, the Bureau of Land Management issues the
lease.86
In Floridav. Watt, the procedure had been somewhat subverted. The
Final Environmental Statement (FES), promulgated in 1973 and supplemented in 1979 (S-FES), was utilized by the Defendants in lieu of the
technical examination-environmental analysis. The plaintiffs alleged that
the FES and the S-FES were technically insufficient to support the type
of findings required by federal regulations.87 As the report provides the
80. 43 C.F.R. 3520.1-1(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
81. 43 C.F.R. 3521.1-4(a)(1)(2) (1982).
82. The National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (1982), requires the
Secretary of Agriculture to develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land management plans
for units of the National Forest System. Id. § 1604(a). The Supervisor of the National Forests in
Florida has approved the Ten Year Goals (pursuant to Section 1602 of the Act, Renewable Resource
Program) for the Osceola, which include under the minerals section: "(a) Utilize minerals only when
mining can be done in harmony with other valuable resources, and environmental impacts can be
acceptably minimized ... (c) Insure minimum surface disturbance and prompt restoration of areas
These goals emphasize that any
impacted during exploration for and extraction of minerals ....
mining must be compatible with concurrent uses of the forest's resources." As cited in, Amended
Complaint at 9, Florida v. Watt (emphasis added).
83. 43 C.F.R. 3521.1-4(b) (1982).
84. 43 C.F.R. 3521.1-5(a)(b) (1982).
85. 43 C.F.R. 3521.I-1(e)(1) (1982). The initial application for a lease is termed an "initial
showing." 43 C.F.R. 3521.1-1(b) (1982).
86. 43 C.F.R. 3521.1-1(h) (1982).
87. Amended Complaint at 33, Florida v. Watt.
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basis for formulating lease stipulations, and ultimately determines what
costs the permittee must incur, the validity of the data upon which the
stipulations are based is crucial.
An illustration of the problem engendered by reliance on nonvalidated
technology was presented in the amended complaint, in Florida v. Watt.
The State pointed out that initial mining plans were to place slime ponds
and benefication plants8 on private property located outside of the forest
boundaries. The proposed lease stipulations, however, provided for benefication plants and temporary slime ponds. 89 With the technological
feasibility of restoring mined land and areas which have contained slime
ponds in question," the formulation of lease stipulations is a formidable
task because it must comply with the mandates of existing federal regulations, 9 and insure that the land will be preserved for its intended
purpose and administered uses.
The significance of the setting of the lease terms, and the fact that it
may involve a great deal of discretion,92 may require a more stringent
analysis than presented in the technological examination-which probably
88. A description of the mining process may aid the reader in envisioning the impact which stripmining will have on the forest's topography. (As described in Amended Complaint at 11, Florida
v. Watt, and by the Florida Phosphate Council, supra note 1, at 9-11.) After drilling holes on 2'12
acres centers to delineate ore bodies, ditches are dug to drain off surface water and all timber is cut.
Remaining vegetation is then bulldozed. If necessary, streams running through the area are rerouted.
Electrically powered draglines are brought in and land (overburden) is stripped away until the
phosphate rock is uncovered-in this case, at the 20-30 foot level below surface.
The cuts made are 150 to 250 feet wide, and may be several thousand feet long. Asump, commonly
called a well, is dug near the mining area, and the phosphate rock (matrix) is dumped into it. Jets
of water are directed into the pit, at capacities of 12,000 gallons per minute. The proposed mining
plan in the Osceola would require the use of approximately 135,000 gallons of water per minute,
of which 10 percent is lost and is made up from deep wells.
The mixture, or slurry, in the pit is then pumped to a benefication (washing) plant through pipelines,
which are sometimes up to ten miles in length. At the plant, phosphate pebbles are washed and
screened from the sand, clay, and fine phosphate particles. The mixture is then pumped into separators.
The clay particles and water are pumped into slime ponds, where the clay settles and then the water
is drawn off. (The phosphate industry eschews the use of the term "slime" pond for "clay waste
settling" pond).
89. It should be noted that the FES assumes that the benefication plant(s), chemical plant, tailings,
slime ponds and associated structures would not be on forest land. FES, supra note 5, at 1-17. The
S-FES considers a hypothetical mining plan which allows for the plants and slime ponds within
forest boundaries. S-FES, supra note 4, at VIII-I.
90. The S-FES notes that the "state-of-the-art in current reclamation practices consists of releveling the ground and fertilizing and seeding the area with millet, bahia grass, ryegrass, etc. Slash
pineprobablycan be reestablished on these areas, although even this assumptionhas not been proved
at this time." S-FES, supra note 4, at VII-I (emphasis added). It is not the primary purpose or
administered use of the Osceola National Forest to grow millet, Bahia grass, or ryegrass. See supra
text accompanying notes 76-78.
91. The difficulty of formulating lease stipulations which preserve the primary purpose of the
forest is compounded when the "technological" study upon which they are based fails to give the
assurance mandated by 30 U.S.C. §352 (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 26.
92. Johns, supra note 58, at 408. The referenced article indicates that if lease terms reflect only
statutory requirements, there is no major discretionary action, and thus no requirement for an EIS.
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is only sufficient to identify general environmental problem areas. 93 Suggestions have been made that as lease terms have a significant effect on
the environment, they may be more appropriately the subject of an Environmental Impact Statement, pursuant to the National Environmmental
Policy Act. 94 In NRDC v. Berklund, the district court noted this: "It is
true that it is the setting of the lease terms which allows the Secretary
maximum discretion . . . if the Secretary decided to set lease terms, he
should have before him a comprehensive EIS which includes . . . estimated costs of compliance." 95
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, stating that
The Department [of Interior] abided by NEPA's requirements ...
by introducing environmentalanalysis at crucialpoints in the leasing
process ... [t]he agency requires a demonstration that the estimated
revenues can reasonably be expected to exceed estimated costs....
Those costs can include the costs of complying with lease terms
demanding complete reclamation and safeguards against environmental harm.96
Thus, the timing of the EIS is inextricable from the entitlement determination. An EIS prepared at a non-crucial time, e.g., prior to formulation
of the lease stipulations, may lead to an invalid determination of the
proper costs to be charged to the permittee, and the determination of
whether costs exceed revenues might well be tainted. 97
Impact of NEPA on Lease Stipulations
The National Environmental Policy Act requires federal agencies to
take environmental factors into account when making discretionary decisions.98 It is, however, clearly inapplicable to decisions of a ministerial
nature. 99 As stated by the court in Kerr-McGee v. Andrus,'o° "Kerr93. Id.
94. The Solicitor of the Department of Interior concluded in 1975 that the Secretary has broad
discretion to impose terms which would make mining impractical or uneconomical, i.e., he would
be complying with the statutory mandate to issue a lease, "albeit a lease with burdensome terms."
Id. at 409. It seems that this discretion is so broad that the determination of lease terms may in fact
be an appropriate subject of an EIS.
95. NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. at 938 (emphasis added).
96. NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
97. Stated in the interrogative: Do the lease terms comply with NEPA by preventing harm to the
environment within the meaning of the Act? It is submitted that an impact statement is required in
order to address that question.
98. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm., 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
99. Union Oil Co. of California v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975) (NEPA not to be applied
to make discretionary an action which was mandatory before its enactment); United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669 (1973) (NEPA not intended to repeal by implication any other statute).
100. No. 76-0608 (D.D.C. 1976). See supra text accompanying note 51.
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McGee's statutory entitlement cannot be abridged by the National Environmental Policy Act. The requirements of that Act cannot supplant the
statutory requirement of § 211 (b).''
Although entitlement, per se, may not be abridged, the MLA provides
the Secretary with discretion in setting the terms and conditions through
lease stipulations, 2 and the courts have not hesitated to use the discretionary act as the "back-door" for NEPA's entrance. Perhaps the most
direct statement to this effect was the following:
Plaintiffs' concern that the Secretary will be forced to issue a lease
where the social and environmental costs of coal mining far outweigh
the benefit is without basis. NEPA requires the Secretary to determine
particularizedlease terms for land reclamation and air, water and
wildlife protection specifying, if necessary, areas which cannot be
mined. It also directs the Secretary to consider "unquantified environmental values." 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B)
In sum, although NEPA does not give the Secretary authority to
reject a lease on purely environmental grounds, it does direct him
to exercise his authority to safeguard society and prevent irreparable
damage to the environment
through a careful and complete formu03
lation of lease terms.1
Lease terms which impose performance standards which are unattainable with current technology, and thus preclude lease issuance, do not
necessarily violate the integrity of Section 211(b). The Berklund court
equated noncompliance due to lack of technology as a "cost" to the lease
applicant.
If the permittee does not have the technological capability to comply
with such standards, the high cost of compliance will outweigh potential coal revenues and he will fail the commercial quantities test.
Until the permittee develops the necessary technology on a cost
effective basis, he will be unable to make the requisite statutory
showing and will not receive the lease."'
The court's analysis is applicable to the valuable deposit test of section
211(b), i.e., the inability of a phosphate lease applicant to comply with
performance standards, and lease stipulations (which comply with NEPA
mandates) due to a lack of technology, will make mining costs prohibitive.
Thus, the permittee will fail the valuable deposit test and, pursuant to
section 211 (b), there is no entitlement to a lease.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Johns, supra note 58, at 406, quoting from Kerr-McGee, No. 76-0608.
30 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. V 1981).
NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. at 936-37 (emphasis added).
Id. at 937.
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As compliance with the stipulations is the final hurdle to entitlement,
it should come as no surprise that the Plaintiff in Florida v. Watt placed
major emphasis on the defective nature of the stipulations, as formulated,
and characterized any decision based on them as "a spurious determination of whether valuable deposits of phosphate exist."10 5 Court II of
the amended complaint, in addition to alleging that the stipulations are
wholly inadequate to protect and preserve the Osceola for its acquired
purposes and administered uses, emphasized that the federal government's
position on feasibility of restoration technology "is not supported by and
is, indeed, contrary to all available scientific evidence.""io6 In support of
its contention, the State noted that the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and Florida
state agencies responsible for research and forest co-management have
found that adequate restoration technology does not exist. 7
Further, in a letter to the Secretary of the Interior, dated May 9, 1980,
the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (Berglund) refused to give
his consent to the issuance of the leases, 0 8 based on the Regional Forester's conclusion that restoration technology was not available.'" The
conclusion, in this instance, was drawn from the FES and S-FES which,
as previously noted, is being used in lieu of a technical examinationenvironmental analysis report.
There was, however, a sudden shift in the Department of Agriculture's
perspective. In response to a letter from Senator Chiles, Secretary Block,
who recently had replaced Secretary Berglund, stated that his position
on the issue was the same (consent withheld?) as indicated in the May
1980 letter to the Department of Interior. The letter notes further, however,
that rights to leases may be confirmed on the basis of stipulations formulated by the Forest Service-implying that it was a decision to be
made by the Department of Interior."'
There was also a significant change in the Department of Interior's
view on the availability of restoration technology."' In a letter to Senator
Chiles, the Undersecretary of the Department of the Interior stated that
"it is our view that present technology gives every indication that mined
105. Amended Complaint at 2, Florida v. Watt.
106. Id. at para 77. All efforts to dry out phosphate slime economically have been unsuccessful.
Gainesville Sun, June 20, 1982, at 6B. Dr. Brij Moudgil, a University of Florida researcher, is
attempting to find a chemical additive which will aid in solidification. Id.
107. Amended Complaint at 2, Florida v. Watt.
108. Pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 352 (Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying note 78.
109. Amended Complaint at Exhibit B, Florida v. Watt.
110. Id. at Exhibit C.
111. The S-FES, which was unable to confirm available technology, is a Bureau of Land Management (Department of Interior) publication.
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land can be restored to meet these requirements." "2 In a second letter to
Senator Chiles, the Assistant Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, Department of Agriculture, was more emphatic. He noted that
since April, 1981, when the Department determined that reclamation
techniques were not such as to insure proper reclamation, "we have again
reviewed the leases in question and the latest technology for reclaiming
phosphate mined lands. That technology has improved significantly in
the last several years, and these improvements must be recognized and
incorporated in the stipulations. . . ."
This was a shift in vocabulary, as well as perspective. Once again, the
"reclamation/restoration" distinction becomes a central issue. The State
spoke directly to the contention of improved technology: "Defendants
are misapplying research underway in the State of Florida intended to
develop techniques to reclaim privately owned lands which have been
stripmined for phosphates to some usable land form as evidence that these
techniques
can restore a national forest for uses for which it was ac'14
quired."
The concern of the State of Florida was exemplified in a letter to the
Secretary of Agriculture from the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation. Fearing that the lease stipulations were based
on invalid assumptions about available technology, the State addressed
the "flawed" nature of the lease stipulations: (1) failure to require restoration so that the lands can be utilized for the purposes for which they
were acquired or are being administered, as required by Section 352 of
the Mineral Leasing Act (stipulations only require capability be restored)
(2) requiring only "similar" vegetative communities be reestablished,
which does not restore the wetlands, or forested ecosystems, (3) dependence on unproven technology for reestablishing tree growth. ',5
Regardless of the federal government's position on restoration technology, it is in apparent contravention of federal regulations which require
that proposed lease stipulations are to be used on a valid technical examination/environmental analysis," 6 and not the generalized observation
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Amended Complaint at Exhibit D, Florida v. Watt.
Id. at Exhibit E. Letter from John B. Crowell to Sen. Lawton Chiles (March 3, 1982).
Amended Complaint at 21, Florida v. Watt (original emphasis).
Id. at para 60(a)-(c).
43 C.F.R. 3521.1-5 (1982). The requirement is noted by the Berklund court:
Defendants ... conduct a "technical examination and environmental analysis"
which includes an analysis of the environmental impact of the proposed mining
operations.... Drawing on information contained in the technical examination
and environmentalanalysis, the defendants then determine lease terms which may
include rentals and royalty payments as well as conditions for mitigation of environmental damage. The mitigating-lease terms are those required by related surface
management regulations, or more stringent terms may be set at the discretion of
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that "technology has improved.""' 7 Lease stipulations, the safeguards
built into the Mineral Leasing Act and recognized by the Berklund court
as fulfilling NEPA's requirement that particularlized lease terms be formulated which protect land, air, water, and wildlife, would seem
of
8
dubious value if not based upon a valid technical examination."
CONCLUSION
The State of Florida's reliance on the substance and procedure indicated
in the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands was well-placed. Section
352 of that Act, requiring the consent of the supervising agency, and
conditions which insure that the lands may be utilized for the primary
purpose for which they were acquired and are being administered, seems
to preclude turning a vast portion of the forest into what one phosphate
industry official characterizes as "a moonscape."" ' 9 The impropriety of
issuing phosphate mining leases may well be underscored by contrasting
the standard of "insuring" primary purpose utilization with the uncertain
nature of the restoration technology in a forest/wetlands environment.
Even if restoration technology were available, this does not mean a
fortiori that phosphate should be mined in the Osceola. The language of
the Act itself indicates an intent to seek a co-existence of utilizations, or,
at the very most, only a temporary dislocation of use while mining activities are carried out. This seems logical in light of the nature of many
of the mining activities which are authorized by the Act. Specifically,
activities such as drilling for oil or natural gas, and other mining operations, are limited in their geographical impact, i.e., they are localized
operations which do not require the extensive removal of thousands of
acres of forested lands. The plausibility of speaking in terms of insuring
the Secretary. 43 C.F.R. Section 5321.1-5(a).
458 F. Supp. at 930-31 (emphasis added).
As to the first emphasized portion, recall that no technical examination/environmental analysis
was done. Further, in order to be consistent, the federal government would have to base stipulations
on the FES and S-FES, which are being used in lieu of technical examination. However, as the
court notes, the examination is done on the "proposed mining plan," and there was no specific plan
in existence at the time the FES and S-FES were formulated.
The indication that more stringent terms, at the discretion of the Secretary, may be formulated,
is consonant with the proposition that an EIS on the lease stipulations may be mandated. See supra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying note 113.
118. As indicated in note 15, supra, Secretary Watt determined that restoration technology did
not exist, and thereby concluded that the commercial quantities test had not been met. Kerr-McGee
Corporation's suit (see supra note 16) is based on their understanding of the Department of the
Interior's position prior to the Secretary's decision. See supra text accompanying notes 108-111.
119. During a televised discussion of the proposed mining in the Osceola, an officer of the Florida
Phosphate Council also noted that "every living thing must be removed from the face of the earth"
during a phosphate mining operation. "The Sawgrass Rebellion," WUFT-TV, Gainesville, Florida
(Sept. 29, 1982).
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primary purpose utilization makes sense when a singular oil or gas rig is
operating, not when thousands of acres of forest and wetlands are stripped
away to become slime ponds.
Evidently the ultimate decision on the issue presented in Florida v.
Watt will be made by an appellate court. As the National Environmental
Policy Act has been construed as an essential factor when evaluating costs
so that an "entitlement" decision can be made, the extent to which the
courts look at both restoration technology and unquantified environmental
costs may well reflect on the measure of vitality of the Act in present
day litigation. The courts may give NEPA a mere glance, choosing to
construe the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act strictly and become
the official pronouncer of the availability, or lack thereof, of restoration
technology.
Due to the consequences of noncompliance, concern about federal
agency adherence to the Mineral Leasing Act should be paramount. While
Section 211(a)'s demand that leasing decisions be made "in the public
interest" is of little sustenance, Section 352's mandate, that the primary
and administered uses be insured, must not be ignored. It provides that
measure of objectivity and standard setting which opens federal agency
decisions to both a demand for compliance and a basis for challenge.

